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Why do parties adjust their positions in the process of electoral competition? Recent research sug-
gests that parties change their positions in response to surprisingly ending up in opposition, or as a 
reaction to getting into government against all odds. Yet, we observe that parties which are not 
expected to change according to this argument are at least as likely to alter their positions as those 
parties that are identified as candidates for adjustment. To solve this puzzle, I argue and empirically 
corroborate that parties are not just office-seekers, but can follow different goals that relate to 
platform change in distinct ways. The puzzling behavior described above can be explained by taking 
into account that parties are not homogenously motivated. Analyzing position changes of 210 most-
ly Western European parties over the post-war period, I demonstrate that a party’s goal-related and 
subjectively assessed performance relates to its positional adjustments in ways that suggest the 
operation of cognitive mechanisms such as endowment effects and loss aversion. This study thus 
contributes to the literature explaining party position change by incorporating more accurately 
theoretical insights about party goals, and by emphasizing the importance of the decision-making 
processes of cognitively limited parties. It helps us to better understand processes of electoral com-
petition.  
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Introduction 
Why do parties adjust their positions in the process of electoral competition? One poten-
tial explanation for this behavior is given by Harmel and Janda (1994) in their integrated theory 
of party goals and party change: parties, which are generally resistant to change, adjust their 
strategies (read positions) in the face of failing to achieve their primary goal. Recently this argu-
ment has been amended by Schumacher, van de Wardt, Vis, and Klitgaard (2015), who reason 
that failure to reach one’s goal does not drive platform change uniformly. Contrarily, these au-
thors argue that office-motivated parties’ responses to ending up in opposition, due to endow-
ment effects and loss aversion (cf. Kahneman et al. 1990), are moderated by their level of office-
aspiration; parties that have constantly been in government and therefore have high aspirations 
change after ending up in opposition. Parties with low aspirations change when they enter gov-
ernment. 
Yet, among those parties which are not expected to adjust their platforms according to 
this argument (e.g. those in office for long, uninterrupted periods) unexpectedly high levels of 
platform change can be observed. The Dutch Christian Democrats, for example, changed their 
platform on average on six dimensions per election during their long spell of continuous gov-
ernment participation that lasted until the mid 1990s. Other parties with long-lasting control over 
government display similar behavior: the Swedish social democratic party changed its positions 
on average on four dimensions during its most successful period, the Italian Christian Democrats 
on five, and the Belgian Christian Democrats on eight dimensions. Parties that compete success-
fully and achieve their office-related goals seem at least as likely to change their platforms as 
parties that surprisingly fail to meet their goal. 
In this paper I set out to shed light on this puzzle. I argue that the limited success of ac-
counting for this behavior is due to the inaccurate conceptualization of parties as office-seekers 
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only. Parties can follow multiple goals (Strøm 1990) and the mechanisms connecting these party 
objectives to party position change vary. Specifically, in this paper I provide an answer to the 
question to what extent parties’ goal-related performance and aspirations affect party position 
change. I suggest that the shock of a bad performance or the prospects of future failure induce 
loss-averse office- and vote-motivated parties to change their positions. For policy-oriented par-
ties on the other hand, it is mainly the prospect of shaping public policy in the future, and the 
anticipation of the process that governs this act, that leads to platform change.  
Analyzing platform change of 210 parties from the Western hemisphere over the period 
1950-2013 I find broad support for these claims: only the government-opposition status of par-
ties with high office-aspirations does not relate to platform change as expected. This study thus 
advances the literature on party position change on an important theoretical and empirical di-
mension. It incorporates more accurately theoretical insights about party goals into the empirical 
study of platform change by emphasizing and showing that parties can follow different motiva-
tions and that these relate differently to change. Taking this into account, not only failure, as the-
orized by Harmel and Janda (1994), or in addition the prospect of failure, as expected by Schu-
macher and colleagues (2015), but also the prospect of success can lead parties to change their 
positions. This has important implications for our understanding of the behavior of competitive 
political parties. When taking their positions they are not just driven by environmental incen-
tives, as implied by a large number of studies, but some parties proactively adjust their platform 
in anticipation of electoral success.  
To take the reader to this conclusion the rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the 
following section I will provide a brief review of the literature on party position change that 
leads to my theoretical argument about the relations between party goals and platform change. In 
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the same section I will formulate a number of hypotheses that will be tested and discussed in the 
subsequent part. In the last section I will summarize my argument and findings, highlight their 
implications, and conclude. 
 
Theoretical Background 
The Literature   
Ever since Downs’ (1957) Economic Theory of Democracy the study of party positions 
and party position change has received considerable scholarly attention. In this paper a party 
position is defined as the aggregated set of policies a party wants to enact, its ideas and beliefs in 
a specific point in time, as expressed by the party in its election program. Change or adjustment 
of this position occurs if a party alters these expressions. Parties position themselves on a number 
of dimensions – issues aggregated in one way or another – which constitute the multi-
dimensional policy space.  
The political science literature has attempted to provide explanations for parties’ posi-
tional adjustments largely following three approaches: scholars have developed spatial rational 
choice models of party competition deductively (e.g. Downs 1957; Hinich/Ordeshook 1970; 
Wittman 1983; Cox 1990; Calvo/Hellwig 2011), they have taken over elements of these models 
to analyze the empirical patterns of party position change, and they have tried to explain these 
patterns from non-rational choice perspectives. Due to the empirical approach that I take in this 
paper, this review will focus on the latter two of these strands. 
While scholars in the first of these two empirical traditions (e.g. Adams et al. 2004, 2006, 
2009; Adams/Somer-Topcu 2009; Ezrow et al. 2011; Haupt 2010; Ward et al. 2011) mostly 
maintain the core assumption of the rational choice approach that parties are rationally adjusting 
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their positions in an attempt to maximize their payoffs in elections, these scholars pay close at-
tention to the internal and external conditions under which parties operate. Central is the argu-
ment that parties change their platform in response to changing environmental incentives. Parties 
are shown to respond to changes of the position of the (partisan-) median voter as expected by 
Downs (among many others Adams et al. 2004; Ezrow et al. 2011); they adjust their positions in 
the context of differing electoral institutions (Calvo/Hellwig 2011), and they react to changes in 
global economic conditions (Adams et al. 2009; Haupt 2010; Ward et al. 2011).  
At the same time, studies in this tradition have increasingly acknowledged that parties 
and their leaders are not entirely free in responding to these environmental stimuli optimally (i.e. 
choosing the position that yields the largest utility according to the spatial model). Their ability 
to shift their position towards the strategically demanded ideal position is curtailed both by party 
internal and external factors. Internally, party organizational features that relate to the balance of 
power between party leaders and rank-and-file activists moderate parties’ responses, with activ-
ist-dominated parties being less flexible than leader-dominated ones (Schumacher et al. 2013). 
Similarly, niche parties, due to their higher policy orientation, display greater stability in party 
positions (Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow et al. 2011; but see Tromborg 2015), and party internal fac-
tions constrain their leaders across different kinds of parties (Budge et al. 2010; Ceron 2012). 
Faced with the changes that the world of party politics has gone through in recent dec-
ades, e.g. growing electoral volatility (Drummond 2006), the rise of new parties (Mudde 2013) 
and of new issues (Kriesi 2010), this literature now faces the problem that, in order to keep up 
with these changes, explanations are becoming more conditional, context dependent, and less 
parsimonious. 
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In contrast to these studies, a range of scholars have generally questioned the use of ra-
tional choice models for the study of party competition. In his new spatial theory of party compe-
tition, Budge (1994) argues that due to the great uncertainty surrounding electoral competition, 
cognitively limited parties apply simple decision rules to determine whether and how to change 
their platform. Recently Budge amended this explanation by arguing that the most relevant of his 
identified heuristics, the “past results model” (in which parties evaluate the success of their pre-
vious positional adjustment by setting it in relation to their electoral outcomes) interacts with 
party-internal factional change (Budge et al. 2010). This point echoes Harmel and Janda (1994) 
who argue that the most relevant mechanism leading to platform adjustment are changes to party-
internal power relations. Furthermore these authors argue that the most relevant causes of plat-
form change are goal-related shocks “which cause a party to reevaluate its effectiveness in meet-
ing its primary goal” (Harmel/Janda 1994, 265).  
More recently, two studies have advanced arguments that emphasize the operation of 
cognitive mechanisms within parties that shape their behavior. Bendor and colleagues (2011) 
suggest that parties are satisficing actors who change their strategies when outcomes do not satis-
fice. Assuming that parties are office motivated, their study claims that this is the case if parties 
fail to enter government. Schumacher et al. (2015) on the other hand, while maintaining the as-
sumption of office-motivated parties, argue convincingly that the effect of ending up in opposi-
tion varies with regard to a party’s office-aspiration; a dynamic benchmark against which out-
comes are assessed. Furthermore, they amend Bendor et al.’s theory and suggest that endowment 
effects and risk attitudes (cf. Kahneman et al. 1990; Tversky/Kahneman 1992) are the mecha-
nisms driving this behavior. And indeed, in accordance with this logic, the authors find that par-
ties that unexpectedly ended up in opposition, or surprisingly managed to get into government 
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are more likely to change their positions than parties whose office performance was broadly in 
line with their aspirations (Schumacher et al. 2015, 1050). 
Yet, a quick glance at the data presented below reveals the fact that a number of parties 
which are not expected to adjust their platforms according to this argument adjust their positions 
at levels that can hardly be squared with this logic. The Dutch Christian Democrats, for example, 
during their long spell of continuous government participation changed their platform on average 
on six dimensions per election. Other parties with long-term control over government display 
similar behavior: the Swedish SAP changed on average on four dimensions during its most suc-
cessful period, the Italian Christian Democrats on five, and the Belgian Christian Democrats on 
eight dimensions – all on more than the average level of platform change observed in my data. 
Indeed, as Figure 1 illustrates, parties that compete successfully and achieve their office-related 
goals are at least as likely to change their platforms as parties that surprisingly fail to meet their 
goal. How can we explain this puzzling behavior? In the following section I argue that the lim-
ited success of accounting for this pattern is due to the inaccurate conceptualization of parties as 
office-seekers only. Parties can follow multiple goals (Strøm 1990) and the mechanisms connect-
Figure 1. 
Note: The figure displays on how 
many dimensions parties with contin-
uous government participation in the 
past change their positions in response 
to failing or succeeding to enter gov-
ernment (data described below).    
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ing these party objectives to party position change vary. When we take into account the different 
objectives that parties can pursue, the behavior of parties like those mentioned above becomes 
understandable.   
How Party Goals relate to Platform Change 
Party Goals 
Drawing on Strøm (1990), Harmel and Janda (1994), and Budge (1994), I argue that par-
ties’ behavior is significantly shaped by their pursuit of potentially incompatible goals and the 
trade-offs they face in their attempt to reach them. Parties who are here conceptualized as cogni-
tively limited actors performing under uncertainty and risk, prioritize one goal and devise and 
apply strategies that they belief will help them reach it – sometimes at costs with regard to other 
goals, sometimes in line with these. Parties may be primarily vote-seeking, office-seeking, or 
policy-seeking, and which of these objectives they prioritize depends on their organizational 
characteristics and the institutional constraints under which they operate (Strøm 1990). Building 
on Strøm (1990), in this paper the goals of parties are defined as follows. Whereas vote-seeking 
parties aim to increase their electoral support, office-seeking parties seek to expand their control 
over government. Policy-seeking parties aim to increase the congruence between public policy 
(PP) and their own ideal policy preferences.  
There is an unresolved discussion in the literature about whether it is possible to reduce 
this trias of party goals further, to determine a priori a hierarchy of objectives, or to establish 
their mutual compatibility (for a recent discussion see Pedersen 2012, 897-900). In most cases, 
scholars assume that the main trade-off that parties face is that between office and policy; votes 
are often regarded as clearly subordinate and instrumental to reaching these goals (e.g. La-
ver/Hunt 1992). While it may be true that for most parties this configuration of goals is indeed 
Policy, Office, and Votes – How Party Goals Relate to Party Platform Change 
 
8 
 
pertinent, I refrain from theorizing explicitly which hierarchies of aims parties might have and 
how they resolve each individual trade-off; I do not believe that a single and parsimonious model 
exists that accurately gives account of the large number of potential goal-compositions, compati-
bilities, and party behaviors. Nonetheless, taking into account the possibility of different motiva-
tions and deriving expectations about their relations to party position change is a more fruitful 
approach than making the unrealistic assumption of homogenously motivated parties (as done for 
example by Laver 2005; Bendor et al. 2011; Schumacher et al. 2015). 
Parties pursue control over government or votes for the values instrumentally linked to 
these goods and realized in the direct aftermath of an election. Those values include the financial 
support that parties receive in most countries, based on the share of votes they get in an election 
(cf. Scarrow 2006), and votes get translated into parliamentary mandates which are valuable po-
sitions for party elites. Control over government, furthermore, brings with it an additional range 
of values: “power, prestige, [and] income” for party elites (Downs 1957, 291) as well as high 
profile positions to be distributed among the protégés of these elites (Kopecky/Scherlis 2008).  
The value pursued by policy-oriented parties on the other hand is simultaneously both 
less immediate as it takes time to be realized, more enduring as policy once implemented is diffi-
cult to change, and more direct as it derives from the implemented policy itself: policy-oriented 
parties aim to implement a PP that matches their ideals and ideas about what PP should look like. 
What sets policy-oriented parties apart from vote- and office-motivated ones is thus the fact that 
for them, winning votes and gaining access to office can serve their goal to shape PP instrumen-
tally – although neither large vote shares, nor government participation are necessary or suffi-
cient conditions for that – whereas vote- and office-motivated parties use policy (promises) in-
strumentally to achieve their main objectives. For the former implementing policy is the goal; for 
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the latter the promise to do so is a means to garner electoral support and to increase their chance 
of getting into government. As I will argue in more detail below, this does not mean, that policy-
motivated parties are “ideologically dogmatic, unconcerned with winning, or [value] platform 
position as an end itself” (Wittman 1987, 142). To the contrary, policy-oriented parties are inter-
ested in shaping PP and they are aware of the rules governing that game. Therefore, compromise 
on platform position is perfectly in accordance with their primary motivation (Wittman 1983; 
Ward et al. 2011, 516).  
The Aspiration Level 
Building on Schumacher and colleagues (2015) and Bendor et al. (2011), I argue in this 
paper that cognitive mechanisms relating to the prospects of winning and losing values related to 
party goals in the future are the drivers of party position change. Important in that respect is to 
realize that the failure and success for parties to meet their goals and to reap potential values are 
not based on external criteria, but are determined “in the eye of the beholder” (Harmel/Janda 
1994, 269). In order to infer what counts as success or failure, I rely on Bendor and colleagues’ 
(2011, 9) concept of the aspiration level. This level is defined as a dynamic threshold separating 
outcomes into satisfying and unsatisfying ones. Parties fail to reach their goal and lose valued 
goods when their performance delivers an outcome below their aspiration level (cf. Bendor et al. 
2011, 8-11).  
In this context the question remains where exactly this cutoff point between satisfying 
and unsatisfying outcomes (i.e. the aspiration level) is situated. For one vote-seeking party losing 
one percent of the vote share might come as a shock; for another, losing one percent might still 
be acceptable. While Bendor and colleagues (2011, 59) assume that all parties are office-seeking 
and that therefore the cutoff point has to be the static dividing line between getting into govern-
ment and ending up in opposition, Schumacher and associates (2015) emphasize that the level of 
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aspiration is a dynamic threshold. Maintaining that all parties are office-motivated, but not to the 
same extent, these authors argue that a party’s office aspiration level adjusts dynamically in re-
sponse to a party’s past performance. A party that succeeds in winning office raises its future 
aspirations in that regard. If a party fails to win office, its aspiration level adjusts downwards. I 
assume that policy- and vote-aspirations are formed in similar ways. Parties that lose votes in an 
election adjust their vote-aspirations downwards, and upwards if they gain votes. Likewise, par-
ties that could increase the congruence between their ideal policies and PP in the past get higher 
aspirations to do so again in the future, and they will lower these if PP drifts away from their 
ideal positions.  
Schumacher and colleagues’ (2015, 1044) emphasis of the dynamic quality of the aspira-
tion level is worthwhile. However, in this paper I qualify their definition with regard to the tem-
poral aspects of past performance and aspirations. Schumacher et al.’s aspiration level is formed 
as the result of an infinitely long-lasting memory of a party. Following this view, a party that has 
been excluded from government after its first election, but has held on to office ever since, will 
never be able to reach the highest level of office-aspiration. Similarly, a party that has governed 
for the complete first half of its political existence but has been excluded from government ever 
since, is treated as a party with medium office aspirations, which needs to pass a relatively high 
threshold in order to reach a satisfying outcome despite its long-lasting spell of poor perfor-
mance. These implications of the conceptualization are not only unsatisfying from an empirical 
point of view,
1
 they also reveal a theoretical shortcoming: parties memories are not infinite. To 
the contrary, I argue that both organizational and cognitive mechanisms leave us with parties 
                                                          
1
 Does it make sense to treat a party that alternates between government and opposition equal to the party de-
scribed in the second example? 
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which tend to place more emphasis on their recent past and which form their aspirations based on 
their performance within that time frame.  
From an organizational perspective, we know that party leaders and elites attempt to stra-
tegically set the course of their parties. And while the memory of ordinary members in some 
parties might be long and indeed serve as a personal benchmark for current performance, there is 
no discernible reason for party leaders to use these yardsticks too. Any leader or elite within a 
party that strategically evaluates a party’s performance will compare it to the performance 
achieved under similar conditions – and those are usually found in the more recent past. Alterna-
tively, cognitive mechanisms such as the availability heuristic (Tversky/Kahneman 1974, 1127) 
can explain why actors base their assessment of a situation on recent events, ignoring those piec-
es of information that are less easily retrievable. Following either of these logics the aspiration 
level can thus be conceptualized as the threshold separating satisfying from unsatisfying out-
comes which dynamically adjusts to the performance of the recent past. It plays an important part 
in the behavior of political parties. In the following paragraphs I will show how.  
Bringing it Together – Party Goals, Aspirations, and Platform Change 
As argued by Schumacher and colleagues (2015), endowment effects and risk taking (cf. 
Kahneman/Tversky 1979; Kahneman et al. 1990; Tversky/Kahneman 1992) might be the mech-
anisms linking goal-related performance, measured against the benchmark of aspirations, to a 
change of strategy. Endowment effects, whereby the mere possession of a good increases its val-
ue for the proprietor – be it an individual or group – lead these actors to engage in loss-avoiding 
behavior (Kahneman et al. 1990, 1326). The more likely they perceive the chance that they will 
lose the good again, the more risk-seeking their strategies to hold on to it become. The more cer-
tain they are that they will hold on to the good, the more they avoid risky strategies 
(Tversky/Kahneman 1992). 
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How do endowment effects and risk-taking relate to goal-oriented political parties? As I 
have indicated above, office and votes are goods that – if pursued by office- or vote-oriented 
parties – can induce endowment effects and different forms of risk attitudes (cf. 
Tversky/Kahneman 1992). The situation is different for policy-oriented parties, and I will discuss 
them below. For now I assume that parties want to hold on to what they have gained, be it votes 
or office, and that the chance with which they expect to succeed or fail in that endeavor critically 
shapes their behavior. 
For vote-oriented parties this means that the party position as one of the strategic means 
to reach their goal will be adjusted in response to an unexpectedly good performance by some, 
and an unexpectedly bad performance by others. On the one hand, parties which have high vote-
aspirations and perform well have little reason to expect that they will perform bad in the future 
and lose their vote-related endowments. Similarly, parties with a low vote-aspiration level deliv-
ering a poor performance perceive as negligible the chance that they will gain meaningful vote-
endowments in the future. Both types of parties will act in a risk-avoiding manner and will not 
adjust their positions. On the other hand, parties that entered an election with high vote-
aspirations and reached an unsatisfying outcome will be more risk-seeking in the next election. 
The shock of failure and the painful loss of their endowments are the drivers of this behavior. 
Accordingly, I hypothesize that:  
H1: The higher a party’s vote-aspiration level, the more it adjusts its position in response 
to a bad vote performance. 
Additionally, parties whose performance exceeded their low aspirations fear losing their 
new endowment again – their record of past disappointing performances and the generally ob-
servable trend of vote gains being followed by losses (cf. Somer-Topcu 2015, 849), which weigh 
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heavier for parties with lower vote aspirations, as they make up a larger proportion of their re-
ceived goods, make losing their newly won endowment a realistic possibility – and will be in-
clined to engage in risk-seeking behavior to secure it in the future. I expect that: 
H2: The lower a party’s vote-aspiration level, the more it adjusts its position in response 
to a good vote performance. 
Similar logics hold with regard to office-motivated parties (cf. Schumacher et al. 2015). 
Being in government enables a party to extract values it fears losing again in the future (see 
above) and endowment effects are likely to be present. Again, performance that is broadly in line 
with a party’s aspirations induces parties to stick to their strategy. The chance perceived by a 
high-aspiration governing party that it will end up in opposition in the future will likely be mar-
ginal. And the perceived prospects of a low-aspiration opposition party to enter government will 
be just as small. Both parties have little incentive to adjust their positions. Conversely, high-
aspiration parties that failed to get into government lost their endowment, and this shock leads 
them to become more risk-seeking. This expectation leads to hypothesis 3: 
H3: The higher a party’s office-aspiration level, the more it adjusts its position in re-
sponse to being in opposition. 
The same behavior is exhibited by low-aspiration parties who surprisingly entered gov-
ernment. These parties face a large chance of losing this endowment again, not only because of 
their past track record, but also because of the costs associated with governing: the significant 
chance of losing the next election (Schumacher et al. 2015, 1043). Hypothesis 4 thus reads: 
H4: The lower a party’s office-aspiration level, the more it adjusts its position in re-
sponse to being in government. 
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Accepting higher risks, both of these parties will change their platforms in an attempt to 
increase the chance of gaining back what they have lost, or holding on to what they have gained.  
 I have indicated above that the mechanisms leading vote- and office-oriented parties to 
change are not the same that induce platform change in policy-oriented parties. The main reason 
for this, I argue, is that the good gained by shaping PP is not one that entails endowment effects. 
It is not one that is purchased for ‘consumption’ (cf. Kahneman et al. 1990, 1328): what policy-
oriented parties can win or lose in the future is their ability to shape PP according to their creeds. 
Implemented policy, however, is what these parties care about, and due to the nature of the policy 
process (e.g. Jones/Baumgartner 2005) they are unlikely to lose endowments of that kind in the 
foreseeable future. Certainly, a change of direction of PP away from a party will be unsatisfying 
for it and might lead a party to reconsider its strategies, but the policies this party managed to 
implement in the past are very likely to stay. There is thus no need for policy-oriented parties to 
become risk-seeking and change their strategy in response to surprisingly winning or losing poli-
cy influence. 
But how does policy-orientation relate to party position change? I propose that it is the 
prospect of shaping PP in the future that leads parties to change their platforms – and govern-
ment participation is by no means the only way to do so, or a guarantee for success. This conclu-
sion is based on the following argument. As I have stated above, policy-oriented parties are in-
terested in shaping PP without being dogmatic about this, and they know that doing so usually 
involves compromise and trade-offs: in the process of government formation parties bargain over 
policy (Strøm et al. 2008), and with the parliament they face an institution that uses multiple 
channels to influence PP (Sieberer 2011). As minority government parties they depend even 
more on legislative support (Bergmann 1993), and other veto players such as upper chambers 
Policy, Office, and Votes – How Party Goals Relate to Party Platform Change 
 
15 
 
can always demand concessions with regard to policy to be implemented (Tsebelis 2011). Fur-
thermore, I assume that parties are willing to compromise and to trade in some of their positions 
if they believe that this will increase their chance of shaping PP in a way that does not mean giv-
ing up their core policy ideas (cf. Wittman 1983; Ward et al. 2011). For example, parties might 
change their platform in attempt to increase their coalition appeal by making their program more 
compatible with that of another party. Or alternatively, parties might change the content of their 
programs at the margins to enlarge their options in policy-bargaining strategies with other gov-
ernment parties or in parliament. Similarly, parties that hope to affect PP through other channels 
than the cabinet might slightly amend their platforms for strategic reasons as well. At the same 
time parties are bound by their promises and – if in the position to do so – will implement poli-
cies that are strongly constrained by the pledges made in their election programs 
(Mansergh/Thomson 2007).  
For parties with a high prospect of shaping PP, adjustments of their programs can raise 
the perceived chance of indeed shaping it in the future and increase the value of the final good 
gained. Policy-oriented parties with low policy-aspirations, on the other hand, have no reason to 
trade in policy promises for that goal, as the costs of programmatic adjustments needed would 
outweigh the value potentially gained by implementing the promised (and distant) policy. For 
them, there is little reason to draft a program that diverges from the one they will present in par-
liamentary opposition and to the public. It follows that whereas parties with high prospects of 
shaping PP in the future have reasons to adjust their programs, parties with low prospects in that 
regard have no incentive to do so. And again, because of cognitive limitations, parties evaluate 
their prospects in light of their recent performance; the chances of shaping PP are estimated with 
the help of heuristics that overemphasize parties’ experiences in comparable past situations (cf. 
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Tversky/Kahneman 1974, 1127), and parties’ policy-aspiration levels represent precisely these 
experiences.  
This argument leads to the following two hypotheses: 
H5a: The higher a party’s policy-aspirations, the more it adjusts its platform. 
But since parties change their positions without giving up their ideological core I hypothesize 
that: 
H5b: High policy-aspirations do not lead to change on the ideological left right dimen-
sion.   
While the arguments advanced in this section are limited in the same way as the studies 
by Bendor and colleagues (2011) and Schumacher and colleagues (2015), in the sense that I can-
not specify which primary objective a given party at a given point in time will follow, this paper 
advances the literature in two aspects. Specifically, it incorporates theoretically and empirically 
insights derived from the study of party goals, by emphasizing that parties can follow different 
motivations than just gaining access to office. Parties respond to their goal-related performance 
and to the prospects of future gains or losses, and the type of goal they aspire has an impact on 
the way they act. In order to understand the behavior of political parties in the process of elec-
toral competition more accurately, our models need to allow for the possibility of heterogeneous-
ly motivated parties. Secondly, the paper clarifies the conceptual distinction between these party 
goals, and the level of aspiration parties may have with regard to these goals, as well as how the-
se are formed. The aspiration level is the threshold that determines whether an outcome counts as 
a success or not; it divides satisfactory from unsatisfactory results (Bendor et al. 2011, 9) based 
on the performance of the recent past. It is not the same as a party’s primary goal and only in 
some situations can we use the one in order to deduce the other (e.g. when a party that is fre-
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quently successful in getting into government adjusts its primary motivation and becomes office-
seeking cf. Harmel and Janda 1994, 280-81). On the one hand, when we inquire about a party’s 
primary goal, we ask which objective it desires the most. Its aspiration level on the other hand 
determines what counts as a satisfying or unsatisfying outcome with regard to a goal. 
 
Empirical Analysis: Party Goals and Platform Change
2
 
Data and Variables 
 In order to answer the research question of this paper and to test the hypotheses spelled 
out in the previous section I employ a large-n quantitative research design that is based on the 
data provided by the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2015) and the ParlGov data-
base (Döring/Manow 2016). I analyze party position shifts of 210 parties in 25 established de-
mocracies for the period 1950-2013. The unit of analysis is a party at a given election so that 
individual parties contribute multiple observations to the data set, and accordingly the data will 
be treated as pooled and unbalanced time-series data. 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable of my analysis platform change is operation-
alized and measured the following way: as the measure commonly applied in the literature, the 
absolute difference between a party’s position on the CMP left right scale (‘rile’) at electiont-1 
and electiont, is limited (a) because it captures change only unidimensionally and ignores im-
portant aspects of the process of party competition (e.g. Riker 1986), and (b) because it is subject 
to a range of methodological and conceptual issues (e.g. Benoit et al. 2009; Mikhaylov et al. 
2012) my main dependent variable platform change is based on the method suggested by Schu-
macher and colleagues (2015, 1046) and displays change as a count variable that indicates on 
                                                          
2
 A replication script detailing all analytical steps taken in the analysis is available from the author. 
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how many dimensions a party has changed. It compares party positions on 19 scales that repre-
sent different issue dimensions, based on the CMP issue categories, between two elections and 
sums up the number of dimensions on which a party has significantly changed its position. To do 
so, it makes use of the procedure developed by Benoit and colleagues (2009) and takes into ac-
count the uncertainty surrounding CMP-based positions (see the complementary material and 
Schumacher et al. 2015, 1047 for more information).
3
 Figure 2 displays the distribution of plat-
form change in my sample. It shows that most party platforms are changed on a relatively mod-
erate number of dimensions and that radical change is rare. The variable thus captures the well-
documented pattern of broad stability of party positions with exceptional cases of large-scale 
change (e.g. Budge et al. 2009, 792). Furthermore we see a steady increase in the number of ad-
justments that parties make to their platforms over the years.  
                                                          
3
 To test the robustness of results, and to ease comparison with other studies, I operationalized platform change in 
two additional ways and replicated my analysis with these dependent variables. The results of these models and an 
illustration of the differences between the three variables can be found in the appendix. 
Figure 2. Overview of platform change 
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Central independent variables. The central independent variables of my analysis are 
measures of the policy-, vote- and office performance of a party in relation to its respective aspi-
rations, of these aspiration levels, and for votes and office an interaction of the performance indi-
cator and the corresponding aspiration level. Beginning with office motivations, the performance 
indicator opposition states whether a party ended up in opposition (1) or in government (0) at 
electiont-1. A party’s office-aspiration level is measured as the share of election cycles a party 
was in government over the three cycles prior to electiont-1. It thus ranges from 0 (never in gov-
ernment – low aspiration level) to 1 (always in government – high aspiration level). For this and 
the following aspiration level variables, a period of three election cycles was chosen to measure a 
party’s recent experience. While this is an arbitrarily selected threshold, I believe that it captures 
the longevity of a party’s memory: on average one election cycle lasts three and a half years in 
the sample, and party elites – those actors with the relevant memory (see above) – change about 
once in eight years (cf. Andrews/Jackman 2008, 666), a period that is even slightly shorter than 
the chosen time frame.
4
 Hypotheses three and four receive support if the coefficient of the inter-
action term of the two variables suggests that high-aspiration parties change in response to bad 
performance (opposition =1) and low-aspiration parties adjust their position in response to get-
ting into government. 
Next, the variable vote performance subtracts a party’s vote-aspiration level, which is 
measured as the mean vote share of the previous three elections (i.e. electiont-4 – electiont-2), 
from its vote share at electiont-1. It signals whether a party’s performance was good or bad in 
relation to that party’s vote-aspirations and it thus more accurately reflects a party’s subjective 
assessment of its performance than a comparison to just its last election results. Negative values 
                                                          
4
 The results of models with aspiration levels based on five election cycles, or on the whole period a party was 
observed in the complete dataset (1945-2015) yield no meaningfully different results.  
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on vote performance show that a party has performed below its aspirations, whereas positive 
values indicate a performance beyond its aspirations. A negative coefficient of the interaction 
term of the two indicates support for hypotheses one and two, as this means that high-aspiration 
parties change as a result of bad performance, and low-aspiration parties in response to a good 
performance.  
Lastly, a party’s policy-aspiration level is constructed in the following way. In a first step 
I standardized the absolute distance between a party’s position on the MARPOR left-right scale 
at electiont-1 and the left-right position of the government that came into office at that election, as 
a proxy for a party’s control over PP. The government position is calculated as the mean position 
of the government parties, weighted by the share of seats they contribute to the government’s 
legislative fraction (based on Döring and Manow 2016).
5
 This policy distance can thus theoreti-
cally take values from 0 (perfect congruence between a party’s ideal- and PP) to 1 (perfect dis-
cord between the two). A party’s policy-aspiration level finally, is the scale-reverted mean of the 
policy distance over the last three elections. It takes the value 0 for parties whose ideal policy has 
always differed perfectly from PP (low aspiration) and 1 for a party whose ideal policy has al-
ways been congruent with PP (high aspiration). Figure 3 shows the distributions of all three goal-
related aspiration levels. To control for the possibility that – as only briefly discussed above – 
policy performance induces change, I have also included the variable policy performance which 
measures the difference between a party’s proximity to PP at electiont-1 and its policy-aspiration 
level. Positive values of this variable indicate that a party performed above its aspirations and 
vice-versa.  
 
                                                          
5
 Following the suggestion by Döring & Schwander (2015, 184 Fn. 2) I estimate the government positions of minori-
ty governments at the point halfway between the government and the parliamentary position. 
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Furthermore, I include in my analysis the number of days between two elections to con-
trol for the fact that, if elections take place in short succession, parties might present the same, or 
only a slightly amended program, and platform change might accordingly be lower than normal. 
The effective number of parties at the seat level (Laakso/Taagepera 1979) is included in all mod-
els to account for different patterns of change in different party systems (e.g. Calvo/Hellwig 
2011). An overview of all variables included in the analysis is provided in Table A1 in the ap-
pendix. 
Modeling Strategy 
In order to accurately estimate models explaining party platform change a number of 
modeling decisions have to be made. Firstly, the hierarchical structure of the dataset (i.e. party-
elections are clustered within parties) needs to be taken into account. As observations in my data 
are not independent of one another, errors are potentially correlated within panels (parties) across 
time and contemporaneously across panels, and they can display different levels of homoscedas-
ticity across panels and therefore be inefficient. Furthermore, unobserved differences between 
parties can bias estimated coefficients and lead to false inferences (Beck/Katz 1995; Beck 2008). 
Figure 3. Distributions of aspiration variables 
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To remedy these problems I estimate multilevel models with random party-effects (i.e. a random 
intercept parameter, indicating different baseline probabilities for each party to change) that can 
handle these issues. The random effects specification has been chosen for both theoretical and 
methodological reasons (cf. Plümper et al. 2005). Theoretically, including fixed effects would 
mean to estimate models that explain platform change based on within-party differences of aspi-
rations and performance only, but I expect platform change to be the result of both these within-
party differences and differences between parties. Furthermore, including fixed effects would 
suppress the estimation of level effects (i.e. an effect that is due to the level of a certain variable, 
e.g. those triggered by a party’s aspiration, and not due to changes in this level) and of effects of 
(largely) time invariant variables (again a party’s aspiration level is an example, as there are par-
ties who maintain the same level of e.g. office aspiration throughout the period under investiga-
tion) and make inferences about their impact on platform change impossible.  
 Secondly, as the dependent variable of my analysis platform change is a count variable, 
estimating OLS models would lead to false inference. For regression analyses with count varia-
bles as outcomes, Poisson or negative binomial models and their zero inflated versions that esti-
mate the log count of the dependent variable are appropriate. As my dependent variable is over-
dispersed, that is, its conditional variance is larger than its conditional mean (Wooldridge 2015, 
548), Poisson models would estimate inefficient coefficients and therefore I estimate panel nega-
tive binomial regression models with random party effects.  
Analysis and Discussion – Explaining Party Position Change 
I will now discuss the results of my empirical analysis. To that end, Table 2 displays the 
results of the base models of my analysis. In these I included the theoretically relevant explanato-
ry variables, as well as the time between elections and the effective number of parties as two 
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more technical control variables. At first I investigate the effects of the different goal-aspirations 
and –performance indicators separately, before I estimate a model that includes all of them in 
combination. The Table displays incident rate ratios (IRR) that indicate how platform change 
varies in response to one unit changes in an independent variable. Values below one indicate less 
change, whereas coefficients above one indicate more change. For example, we see that through-
out the models each day between two elections increases platform change by a factor of 1.0003 
(p<.05) and that each additional effective party in parliament multiplies change by a factor in the 
range of 1.061 – 1.178, that is, by between 6 and 18 percent. 
What are the substantial results of the analysis? Beginning with the effects of office per-
formance the first model shows that, unconditionally, parties that ended up in opposition in the 
last election, adjust their positions almost ten percent less (IRR=.905; p<.05) than government 
parties. However, the interaction effect of this variable and a party’s office aspirations (model 2) 
indicates that these responses vary by the level of office aspiration. A log likelihood ratio test 
indicates that adding the office aspiration variable to the model significantly improves the model 
fit (χ²=13.3; p<.01). For parties with high office aspirations, failing to get into government in-
creases the number of changes they apply to their platforms. Conversely, parties with low aspira-
tions seem to adjust their positions in response to getting into government. I refrain from inter-
preting these effects further at this point, as interaction effects in (non-)linear models are difficult 
to interpret based on effect sizes and p-values only (e.g. Brambor et al. 2006). A more thorough 
interpretation based on the effects of the full model will follow below. 
Models three and four test the effect of vote-performance in interaction with a party’s 
vote-aspirations. Remember that hypotheses one and two stated that low aspiration parties 
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change their position in response to performing well, and high aspiration parties in the aftermath 
of a poor vote-performance.  
Table1. Explaining party position change 
 
Dependent variable: platform change 
 
(Office I) (Office II) (Votes I) (Votes II) (Policy) 
(All  
motivations) 
Opposition .905
*
 .787
*
 
   
.830
*
 
 
(.842, .973) (.703, .881) 
   
(.733, .941) 
Office aspiration 
 
.948 
   
.805
*
 
  
(.809, 1.097) 
   
(.693, .935) 
Vote performance 
  
.998 1.011 
 
1.014 
   
(.99,  1.00) (.992,  1.03) 
 
(.997, 1.03) 
Vote aspiration 
   
1.013
*
 
 
1.010
*
 
    
(1.007, 1.020) 
 
(1.004 1.016) 
Policy performance 
    
.637
*
 .571
*
 
     
(.452 .886) (.394, .769) 
Policy aspiration 
    
6.077
*
 5.197
*
 
     
(3.54, 11.23) (3.288, 8.229) 
Time between  
elections 
1.0003
*
 1.0003
*
 1.0003
*
 1.0003
*
 1.0003
*
 1.0003
*
 
 
(1.0002, 
1.0004) 
(1.0002, 
1.0004) 
(1.0002, 
1.0004) 
(1.0002, 
1.0004) 
(1.0002, 
1.0004) 
(1.0002, 1.0004) 
ENPseats 1.123
*
 1.119
*
 1.125
*
 1.134
*
 1.106
*
 1.113
*
 
 
(1.076, 1.164) (1.076, 1.167) (1.08, 1.17) (1.09, 1.178) (1.061, 1.144) (1.073, 1.158) 
Opposition*Office  
aspiration  
1.356
*
 
   
1.277
*
 
  
(1.118, 1.602) 
   
(1.064, 1.557) 
Vote performance* 
Vote aspiration    
.999
*
 
 
.999
*
 
    
(.998, 1.000) 
 
(.998, 1.000) 
Intercept 1.903
*
 2.061
*
 1.760
*
 1.404
*
 .3814
*
 .426
*
 
 
(1.533, 2.448) (1.572, 2.570) (1.36, 2.16) (1.071, 1.768) (.225, .64) (.273, .658) 
σ-Intercept .762 .756 .768 .715 .724 .678 
Observations 1,643 1,643 1,643 1,643 1,643 1,643 
Parties 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Log Likelihood -4,108 -4,102 -4,112 -4,102 -4,091 -4,076 
AIC 8,228 8,219 8,236 8,220 8,196 8,178 
BIC 8,261 8,262 8,268 8,263 8,234 8,248 
Note: Panel negative binomial regression explaining party position change. Coefficients are incident rate ratios 
(IRR). 95% confidence intervals were obtained via bootstrap procedure (500 iterations); 
*
p<.05 
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In line with these expectations, the interaction effect of vote-performance and -aspirations 
indicates that good performance leads to less change, the higher a party’s aspirations. Parties 
with high vote-aspirations seem to adjust in response to performing below their aspirations, 
whereas their low-aspiration counterparts change after performing well. Interestingly, the aspira-
tion level itself seems to have a positive effect on platform change. It indicates that generally not 
the parties with low vote shares in the past (and neutral performance), but those with comfortable 
vote shares adjust their programs more thoroughly.  
Next, I estimate the effects that policy-aspirations have on party platform change. I have 
argued above that endowment effects and induced risk attitudes are unlikely to be the mecha-
nisms that lead policy-oriented parties to change. Contrarily, I reasoned that it is the prospect of 
shaping PP itself that induces platform change. Hypothesis 5a stated that parties with high poli-
cy-aspirations – those with good prospects of shaping PP again – should change more than low-
aspiration parties. Model 5 provides evidence for this claim. Performing above one’s policy-
aspirations in the prior election reduces the amount of platform change (IRR=.668; p<.05), but 
the level of policy-aspiration itself significantly and strongly enhances it (IRR=5.912; p<.05).
6
 
Parties with higher policy-aspirations change their platforms more drastically than low-aspiration 
parties.  
Do the results of the single-motivation models hold when effects are estimated in one 
model? Estimating a model that includes all theoretically relevant variables is a necessity, as 
parties can prioritize one of the three motivations, but I cannot specify beforehand which of them 
                                                          
6
 I have also tested whether the effect of policy performance – contrarily to my expectations – varies with the level 
of policy aspiration. In the respective interaction models, the coefficients of the two main effects keep their signs, 
and the interaction term is negative and very small. Confidence intervals of the estimates, however, become im-
mensely large, indicating difficulties to estimate these effects. As a marginal effects plot indicates that the (unreli-
able) effect of policy performance is insignificant over almost the whole range of policy aspirations and always 
negative, I decided to display models that exclude this interaction term.     
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will primarily guide their behavior. Therefore, if effects persist that relate to different kinds of 
motivations while variables associated with the other party objectives are included in the model, 
this suggests that indeed all motivations are present. Furthermore, a full model including all theo-
retically interesting variables can increase the credibility of results, as effects that remain un-
changed indicate that different aspiration- and performance variables capture distinct pieces of 
information.  
Beginning with the impact of office-motivation related variables, the effect of office-
performance in interaction with office-aspirations seems robust and strong. However, when we 
look at the left panel of Figure 4, which displays how the effect of ending up in opposition varies 
over different levels of office-aspiration, we see that it does not completely follow the pattern 
that was expected: in line with hypothesis four, for parties with low office-aspirations, the effect 
of ending up in opposition is negative; ceteris paribus low-aspiration parties change their posi-
tions in response to getting into government. High-aspiration parties on the other hand do not 
adjust their positions more when they ended up in opposition after the previous election. While 
Figure 4. Marginal effects based on full model 
Note: The figure displays the effects of ending up in opposition and of a party’s vote performance 
(solid black lines) for the different levels of the respective aspiration variables based on the “all 
motivations” model. 95% confidence intervals are indicated by the grey shaded areas.   
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the estimated effect is positive for parties that have always been in office in the recent past, it 
fails to reach statistical significance. These results are thus not completely in line with the find-
ings of Schumacher and colleagues (2015) and can only be partly explained with the argument 
advanced above that becoming a government party is a good that induces endowment effects. 
Parties that realistically have to fear losing this endowment again follow more risky strategies 
and adjust their platforms in an attempt to hold on to the good in the future. The shock felt by 
parties that have constantly been in government in the past but end up in opposition on the other 
hand, does not seem to affect platform change.  
As the estimated effects based on which I draw this conclusion are very similar to those 
reported by Schumacher et al. (2015, 1049), I suspect that my results do reflect a genuine empir-
ical pattern and are no artifact of the data. Remember that I differed from Schumacher and col-
leagues’ argument and analysis by stressing that parties’ memories do not last infinitely long and 
that their aspiration levels therefore are formed based on more recent performance. Indeed, I ob-
tain similar results as those reported above when admitting a party’s memory to last up to five, 
instead of three election cycles. Only when assuming an infinite memory, does the estimated 
effect of ending up in opposition become significant and positive for high-aspiration parties. 
However, maintaining that a time-less conceptualization of aspirations is inadequate, I trust the 
results of my original analysis and assert that I cannot provide support for hypothesis three: for 
parties with high office aspirations, their government or opposition status does not affect plat-
form change. Conversely, for parties with low aspirations, it seems that “losses loom larger than 
corresponding gains” (Tversky/Kahneman 1992, 303). One potential explanation for these find-
ings could be that high-aspiration governing parties have incentives to adjust their platforms un-
related to their office-endowments, but in connection with other motivations (e.g. they may have 
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fulfilled most of their election pledges and are thus in need of presenting new policies to their 
voters), and that these might overlay the pattern of platform change related to the shock of losing 
office. For low aspiration parties similar incentives do not exist and they respond only to the pro-
spects of losing their imperiled office-endowment.       
With regard to the effects of vote-motivation related variables, the model provides sup-
port for hypothesis one and two. As the right panel of Figure 4 shows, having increased one’s 
vote share in relation to one’s aspirations induces platform change for low-aspiration parties and 
makes change less likely for high-aspiration parties. Parties with on average less than five per-
cent of the votes in the prior elections (18% of the parties in my sample), change their platforms 
in response to gaining votes (p<.1). Those with vote aspirations above 40% (12% of the parties) 
respond to losing votes (p<.05). Risk attitudes triggered by endowment effects could explain 
these patterns. Furthermore, the model adds support to the finding that parties with higher vote 
shares in the past (and a neutral performance), change more than parties with small vote shares 
(cf. Somer-Topcu 2009, 245).  
Lastly, the model supports the earlier finding that the level of a party’s policy aspiration 
significantly increases the number of changes it applies to its platform. Specifically, the model 
estimates that a party changes its platform by an additional 31% (p<.05) for an increase in its 
policy-aspiration level by one standard deviation. I take this as evidence for hypotheses 5a.
7
 The 
result is in line with the argument that parties which perceive to have a high chance of shaping 
PP in the future – due to their heuristic-based assessment of these chances – adjust their positions 
in anticipation of the policy-bargaining and trade-offs that await them. Similarly robust is the 
finding that parties which were able to achieve above-aspiration congruence with PP, change less 
                                                          
7
 Hypotheses 5b that stated that the same pattern should not be observed in relation to change on the ideological 
left-right scale is tested in the appendix and finds robust support. 
Policy, Office, and Votes – How Party Goals Relate to Party Platform Change 
 
29 
 
than parties who performed in a suboptimal way. Irrespective of the current level of a party’s 
policy-aspirations, losing influence on PP leads parties to slightly change their platforms in the 
next elections. In the long run, however, this effect is outweighed by the change induced through 
the policy-aspiration level itself.  
In summary, the previous analysis provides support for the arguments advanced about the 
drivers of platform change for vote- and policy-motivated parties, and is partly in line with the 
expectations derived about the behavior of office-motivated parties. What is more, all results are 
robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables, such as public opinion shifts, economic 
globalization, and party organizational characteristics that have been shown to relate to party 
position change as well.
8
 Naturally, the research design chosen for this study is unable to eluci-
date the causal mechanisms that connect party goals and platform change. Nonetheless, the em-
pirical patterns found are (for the bigger part) in line with my expectations, and the arguments 
that I have advanced above provide potential explanations for them. Clearly, not only the gov-
ernment-opposition dichotomy explains positional adjustments of goal-oriented parties, but poli-
cy- and vote-motivations matter as well. Getting into government affects parties with low office-
aspirations. The effect of losing votes differs between high- and low-vote-aspiration parties. 
High policy-aspiration levels are associated with larger platform changes. Cognitive mechanisms 
such as endowment effects and risk taking, or perceptions of the chance of shaping public policy 
in the future that are based on simplifying heuristics might be the mechanisms leading from 
cause to effect.  
 
                                                          
8
 Detailed results are reported in the appendix. 
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Conclusion 
Why do parties change their position as expressed in their election programs? In this pa-
per I have argued and demonstrated that heterogeneously motivated parties adjust their positions 
in response to their goal-related and subjectively assessed performance in elections. My analysis 
of more than 200 mostly Western European parties over the entire post-war period suggests that 
cognitive mechanisms relating to the prospects of holding on to a gained good in the future con-
nect party goals to party position change.  
Endowment effects lead parties with low levels of vote- or office aspirations to engage in 
risk-accepting behavior and change their platforms in the aftermath of a surprisingly good per-
formance. The fear of losing what they gained strongly affects those parties’ choice of strategies. 
Parties with high aspirations with regard to these goals, on the other hand, were expected to re-
spond to failing to reach their objectives. And indeed, these parties are more inclined to adjust 
their positions in the aftermath of a poor vote-performance. Ending up in opposition, however, 
does not make them change more than their governing counterparts. Ultimately, this finding 
might be due to different mechanisms leading to similar behavioral patterns of these parties. 
High-aspiration parties might adjust in response to the shock of ending up in opposition, but they 
might also adjust due to other factors. Indeed, we see that long-term governing parties such as 
the Dutch, Belgian, or Italian Christian Democrats, or the Swedish SAP display many character-
istics that induce platform change even while being in government: they all had relatively high 
vote shares, but frequently gained less votes than they aspired to. Furthermore, they all decisive-
ly shaped the direction of public policy and had high prospects of doing so again. These pro-
spects and the anticipation of the rules governing this process, in turn, were hypothesized to con-
nect policy-orientations with party position change. My analysis provided clear evidence for the 
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claim that parties who can expect to shape public policy in the future frequently change their 
platforms. Together with the other factors just mentioned, this mechanism can explain the initial-
ly puzzling behavior of long-term governing parties. 
By providing evidence for the claims about the relationships between party-goals and 
platform change this paper has advanced the literature explaining party position change theoreti-
cally and empirically. When we aim to understand the behavior of competitive political parties, 
we need to account for the fact that they can prioritize different objectives and thus are subject to 
different mechanisms connecting their (prospective) performance to the strategies and positions 
they choose. Developing models that can determine a priori the goal hierarchy and trade-offs 
faced by a party at a given point in time will be the next step to be taken in order to improve our 
understanding of the process of electoral competition. Viewing parties as cognitively limited 
actors operating under uncertainty and risk and following different objectives, we can develop 
explanations of their behavior that emphasize much more their own decision-making processes 
and depreciate the alleged impact of environmental factors that are sometimes very far away. 
This paper, with all its limitations, is a cautious attempt to do so.  
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Appendix 
In this appendix the following supplementary information and analyses are presented. At 
first I display descriptive statistics of all variables used in the main analysis of the thesis. Follow-
ing this, a number of robustness checks of the analysis will be conducted. To that end the “all 
motivations” model of Table 1 will be replicated with additional control variables, and zero-
inflated versions of the main models that account for the excess number of zeros in the data will 
be displayed. Following this, I discuss different operationalizations of the dependent variable of 
my analysis and show models that include these versions of platform change. In this section I 
will also demonstrate the limitations to using the standard measure of party position change that 
is applied in the literature.    
Descriptive Statistics  
Table A1. Descriptive statistics 
  
Min Max Median Mean SD Missing 
Independent variable 
       
Platform change 0 17 5 5.156 3.671 0 
 
Dependent variables 
       
Opposition 
 
0 1 1 0.596 0.491 0 
Office aspiration 0 1 0.333 0.378 0.388 0 
Vote performance -25.717 28.65 -0.1 -0.085 4.312 0 
Vote aspiration 0.205 58.55 13.17 18.267 14.148 0 
Policy performance -0.524 0.607 0.011 0.009 0.092 0 
Policy aspiration 0.552 1 0.922 0.903 0.07 0 
Time between elections (days) 140 1988 1386 1263.312 353.055 0 
ENPseats 
 
1.539 9.051 3.698 3.984 1.428 0 
Leader strength -3 6 1 1.446 1.678 963 
Niche party 
 
0 1 0 0.168 0.374 0 
Globalization 15.92 290.79 66.3 72.437 39.959 271 
Median voter shift -0.637 0.531 -0.003 -0.015 0.179 1257 
Observations: 1643; parties (panels): 210; countries included: AUS, AUT, BEL, CAN, CHE, CYP, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, 
GER, UK, GRC, ICE, IRE, ISR, ITA, JPN, LUX, MLT, NTH, NZL, NOR, PRT, SWE 
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Robustness of Results 
The literature has identified a number of factors that affect party position change. How 
robust are my findings regarding the effects of performances and aspirations to including these as 
control variables? To control for the effects of changes in public opinion (e.g. Adams et al. 2004) 
I have added information on shifts of the position of the median voter to my model (based on 
Schmitt et al. 2008), and the influences of economic globalization (e.g. Ward et al. 2011) are 
accounted for by including information on the dependence of a country’s economy on interna-
tional trade (Armingeon et al. 2015). To control for the different abilities of party leaders to 
change platforms in response to these environmental incentives (e.g. Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 
et al. 2011; Schumacher et al. 2013) I followed Adams and colleagues (2006, 513) and indicated 
whether a party counts as a niche party. Furthermore, taking into account Schumacher and col-
leagues’ (2013) warning that this measure glosses over some major differences within this group 
of parties, I constructed an index based on the information of the Political Parties Database 
(PPDB) that describes the balance of power between party elites and leaders, and ordinary mem-
bers and supporters in the manifesto drafting process. The index leader strength is constructed 
by summing a party’s score on the variables C101MAN2 and C102MAN3 (the influence of party 
leaders and the national executive committee in the manifesto drafting process) and subtracting 
from this the sum of the variables C105MAN6 and C106MAN7 (the influence of party members 
and supporters in this process). Initially, all four component variables have been recoded so that 
higher values indicate more influence; the index ranges theoretically from -6 (activist domina-
tion) to 6 (leader domination). Table A2 displays the results of this analysis. Due to large differ-
ences in the coverage of these variables, I re-estimated model 6 of Table 1and added control var-
iables in a step-wise procedure, whereby variables with the least amount of missing values were 
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added first. As a result I refrain from comparing these models among each other and focus on 
comparing the estimated effects of the theoretically relevant variables to those estimated in the 
full model of Table 2.  
The Table shows that the effects estimated in the full model of Table 1 are robust to the 
inclusion of most of these control variables. Only in one case does an effect change its direction 
(policy performance in the last model) and even if the main effects of the theoretically interesting 
variables are estimated as insignificant in some of the models, they still follow the same pattern 
that was reported in the main analysis (see figures A1-A3).  
With regard to the control variables, only the effects of economic globalization and medi-
an voter shifts are significant. Parties competing while being exposed to the forces of economic 
globalization, change their positions more than parties with lower exposition in that regard. This 
finding is in line with the literature that stresses that economic pressures induce parties to change 
their strategies and positions (e.g. Adams et al. 2009; Haupt 2010). The finding about the effect 
of median voter shifts, on the other hand, is counterintuitive as it implies that parties do not re-
spond to changes in public opinion or public ideology. Keeping in mind though that studies 
claiming the existence of a connection of this kind mainly find conditional support for this claim 
(e.g. Ward et al. 2011, Ezrow et al. 2011), this should not be over-emphasized. Furthermore, the 
model on which this coefficient is based, relies on a drastically reduced number of parties, as 
well as countries studied, which makes me reluctant to draw any meaningful conclusions about 
it. 
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Table A2. Full models incl. controls 
 
Dependent variable: party platform change   
 
All motivations 
(A1) 
Niche party & globaliza-
tion (A2) 
Leader strength (A3) 
Niche party, globalization & 
median voter shift (A4) 
Opposition -.187
***
 -.165
***
 -.292
***
 -.222
**
 
 
(-.301, -.072) (-.283, -.047) (-.442, -.142) (-.402, -.041) 
Office aspiration -.217
***
 -.093 -.236
**
 -.223 
 
(-.369, -.066) (-.254, .068) (-.435, -.037) (-.498, .053) 
Vote performance .014
*
 .015
*
 .015 .029
**
 
 
(-.002, .030) (-.001, .030) (-.006, .035) (.007, .052) 
Vote aspiration .010
***
 .011
***
 .002 .012
**
 
 
(.004, .016) (.005, .017) (-.006, .010) (.003, .022) 
Policy perfor-
mance 
-.561
***
 -.554
***
 -.347 .175 
(-.926, -.195) (-.943, -.165) (-.901, .207) (-.485, .836) 
Policy aspiration 1.650
***
 .784
**
 .533 .654 
 
(1.030, 2.260) (.121, 1.450) (-.346, 1.410) (-.705, 2.010) 
Time between  
elections 
.0003
***
 .0002
***
 .0003
***
 .0002
***
 
(.0002, .0004) (.0001, .0003) (.0002, .0004) (.0001, .0004) 
ENPseats .107
***
 .038
*
 .134
***
 .015 
 
(.068, .146) (-.004, .080) (.075, .193) (-.041, .071) 
Niche party 
 
.081 
 
-.002 
  
(-.148, .310) 
 
(-.299, .295) 
Globalization 
 
.006
***
 
 
.004
***
 
  
(.004, .007) 
 
(.002, .007) 
Leader strength 
  
.022 
 
   
(-.049, .093) 
 
Median voter shift 
   
-.291
**
 
    
(-.538, -.043) 
Opposition*Office  
aspiration 
.245
**
 .156 .348
***
 .278
*
 
(.057, .432) (-.040, .352) (.106, .591) (-.036, .592) 
Vote perfor-
mance* 
Vote aspiration 
-.001
**
 -.001
**
 -.001
*
 -.001
***
 
(-.001, -.0001) (-.001, -.0001) (-.001, .0001) (-.002, -.0004) 
Intercept -.853
***
 -.095 .539 .315 
 
(-1.450, -.252) (-.744, .555) (-.319, 1.400) (-.972, 1.600) 
σ-Intercept .678 .582 .508 .535 
Observations 1,643 1,372 680 386 
Parties 210 189 58 102 
Log Likelihood -4,076 -3,450 -1,726 -1,005 
AIC 8,178 6,930 3,480 2,043 
BIC 8,248 7,008 3,543 2,106 
Note: Panel negative binomial regression explaining party position change. 95% confidence intervals obtained via 
bootstrap procedure (500 iterations) 
*
p<0.1 
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Figure A1. Marginal effects based on model A2 
 
Figure A2. Marginal effects based on model A3 
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Figure A3. Marginal effects based on model A4 
 
 
 
Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Models 
As can be seen in Figure 2 my dependent variable contains a large number of zeros, indicating 
that platforms were not changed in between elections. For count data with excess zeros, the esti-
mation of zero inflated models might be more appropriate than standard negative binomial mod-
els. However their multilevel versions are not yet fully implemented in R or any comparable sta-
tistical software. R’s ‘glmmADMB’ package, the software that comes closest to estimating the 
appropriate model (currently it does not allow me to specify predictor variables that explain the 
high number of zeros (cf. Long 1997, 243-47), such as the time between elections, but estimates 
a single parameter explaining the ‘no change’- ‘change’ dichotomy), was used to estimate zero-
inflated negative binomial versions of the models reported in Table 1. These models are dis-
played in Table A3 and lend broad support to my theoretical claims.  
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          Table A3. Explaining party position change – Zero inflated negative binomial models 
 
Dependent variable: platform change 
 
(Office I) (Office II) (Votes I) 
 
(Policy) 
(All  
motivations) 
Opposition .940* .862***    .862*** 
 
(.882, 1.000) (.780, .952)    (.774, .960) 
Office aspiration  .916    .814*** 
 
 (.804, 1.045)    (.707, .938) 
Vote performance   .999   1.012 
 
  (.993, 1.01)   (.997, 1.027) 
Vote aspiration      1.008** 
 
     (1.002, 1.013) 
Policy performance     .707** .631** 
 
    (.515, .969) (.444, .897) 
Policy aspiration     4.801*** 4.632*** 
 
    (2.790, 8.262) (2.585, 8.301) 
Time between  
elections 
1.0002*** 1.0002*** 1.0002***  1.0002*** 1.0002*** 
(1.0001, 1.0003) (1.0001, 1.0003) (1.0001, 1.0004)  (1.0001, 1.0003) (1.0001, 1.0003) 
ENPseats 1.150*** 1.150*** 1.137***  1.102*** 1.108*** 
 
(1.122, 1.175) (1.122, 1.178) (1.109, 1.17)  (1.062, 1.144) (1.067, 1.150) 
Opposition*Office  
aspiration 
 1.246**    1.231** 
 (1.050, 1.480)    (1.032, 1.468) 
Vote performance* 
Vote aspiration 
     .999* 
     (.999, 1.00002) 
Intercept 1.910*** 2.087*** 1.958***  .526 .539** 
 
(1.533, 2.37) (1.670, 2.608) (1.581, 2.43)  (.314, .881) (.303, .957) 
σ-Intercept .733 .721 .742  .688 .656 
Zero-inflation parameter .044*** .042*** .046***  .039
***
 .038*** 
Observations 1,643 1,643 1,643  1,643 1,643 
Log Likelihood -4,077 -4,074 -4,079  -4,062 -4,052 
AIC 8,168 8,165 8,173  8,140 8,132 
Note: Panel zero inflated negative binomial regression explaining party position change. Coefficients are incident 
rate ratios (IRR). 95-% confidence intervals in parentheses; 
*
p<0.1;
 **
p<0.05;
 ***
p<0.01. The second votes model 
failed to converge, and could not be estimated.  
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Table A3 shows that the zero inflated models fit the data better than the models reported in Table 1 in the 
main article.
9
 With regard to the coefficients estimated the models display no meaningful differences; 
effect sizes are comparably strong and significant at same levels. Accounting for the excess number of 
zeros in the data, that is, manifestos that did not change significantly in-between two elections, does not 
alter the results and conclusions to be drawn. As Figure A4 shows, the main model of this step of the 
analysis lends support to the conclusion that office- and vote-motivations relate to platform change 
through cognitive mechanisms as described in the paper, although the estimated effects are significant at 
lower levels. 
 
Discussing the Dependent Variable: Platform Change 
Due to a number of reasons I decided to deviate from the common procedure in the litera-
ture to operationalize party platform/position change as the absolute difference between a party’s 
position on the CMP left right scale (‘rile’) at electiont-1 and electiont. First of all there is consid-
erable doubt whether party competition is accurately described as happening on just one dimen-
sion and whether it can be captured by the rile-measure (e.g. Riker 1968; Benoit/Laver 2007; 
                                                          
9
 Nonetheless, due to the limited ability to estimate these models as theoretically required (cf. Long 1997, 243-47) 
I refrain from basing my main conclusions on them and decided to report results as mere robustness checks. 
Figure A4. Marginal effects based on “All motivations” zero inflated negative binomial model 
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Kriesi et al. 2008). Secondly, both the manifesto drafting process and the coding of manifestos 
by the members of the Manifesto Project (MARPOR) lead to uncertainty surrounding rile-
measures that are not captured accurately in the MARPOR data (Benoit et al. 2009; Mikhaylov et 
al. 2012).  
To create an alternative measure that takes these issues into account, I applied Schu-
macher and colleagues’ (2015, 1046-47) procedure and created my dependent variable that dis-
plays change as a count variable that indicates on how many dimensions a party has changed. It 
compares party positions on 19 scales that represent different issue dimensions, based on the 56 
MARPOR issue categories, between two elections and sums up the number of dimensions on 
which a party has significantly changed its position. I applied the following procedure to create 
it: in a first step I collapsed the 56 base categories into 19 dimensions, each aggregating positions 
on related issues, as suggested by Schumacher et al. (2015, 1047). Secondly, I estimated the un-
certainty surrounding the positions on each of these dimensions following Benoit and colleagues 
(2009). Thirdly, I created a dummy variable for each of the 19 dimensions that indicated whether 
a party’s position differed significantly from one election to the next. Lastly, I created the de-
pendent variable platform change that counted the number of significant changes by election. 
Additionally, to allow for comparison with other studies, I operationalized platform 
change in two other ways. Firstly I measured rile change as the absolute difference between a 
party’s position on the CMP -100 - 100 left right scale (‘rile’) at electiont-1 and electiont, Second-
ly, as this measure does not take into account the uncertainty surrounding rile scores (see above) 
and therefore is prone to report change that is potentially the result of mere measurement error, I 
measure significant rile change as a dummy variable that indicates significant changes on this 
dimension, again based on Benoit and colleagues (2009). 
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Figure A5 illustrates the differences between these three operationalizations with the ex-
ample of the position changes of the Dutch Labor Party (PvdA). Hollow circles in the Figure 
indicate the number of dimensions on which the PvdA significantly changed between two elec-
tions (platform change), whereas red circles display the party’s rile-position with 95% confi-
dence intervals. Most studies analyze differences in rile-positions in an attempt to capture party 
position change. We see however, that most of those differences are not actually significant and 
merely reflect measurement error. (Whereas non-overlapping confidence intervals necessarily 
mean that two adjacent positions differ, overlapping confidence intervals do not sufficiently rule 
out the possibility of significant differences. Therefore, significant differences were determined 
by comparing the observed difference between two positions with the respective critical value of 
the t-distribution.) Whereas my main dependent variable indicates that the PvdA always changed 
on at least one dimension, and altered its positions more frequently in recent years, rile change 
paints the picture of a party moving broadly through the left side of the policy space. Only in 
some instances, however, do displayed changes on the left-right dimension indicate genuine po-
Figure A5. Illustration of dependent variables 
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sitional adjustments and not just differences that are due to measurement error. Only in five elec-
tions did the PvdA present a program that significantly differed from its previous one on the left-
right dimension.  
 It becomes clear that different measures of platform change tell different stories about 
the behavior of political parties, and we can expect that these measures affect the results of our 
analyses. As I have argued above, I do not believe that party competition can be accurately ana-
lyzed by focusing on the ideological left-right dimension only, and if one chooses to study posi-
tion change on this dimension, one should be aware of the other caveats that MARPOR data is 
inflicted with. Bearing this in mind, I repeated my analysis of party position change using the 
versions of the dependent variable described above. 
To begin with, and to illustrate how problematic its use is, I analyzed party position 
change on the left-right dimension, using the most commonly applied measure in the literature: 
rile change. As rile change is a normally distributed continuous variable, and in line with the 
literature, I estimated OLS models that take into account the hierarchical structure of the data and 
the problems associated with this. Specifically, as Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge tests for serial 
correlation, and autocorrelation functions of residuals indicate that errors in my models are first 
order AR(1) serially correlated, I estimate random intercept models with an adjustment for 
AR(1) correlated residuals. I report the result of the replication of the last model of Table 2 only 
(all motivations), and show how unreliable results of models estimating rile change are (Table 
A4). To that effect, I repeated the estimation of the model 100 times, each time simulating rile 
change to be the result of rile values that are drawn at random from the distribution indicating 
the uncertainty surrounding this measure. To simulate the effects that uncertain ‘rile’-variables 
have on the outcome of the analysis I applied the following procedure: 
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1. I added (random) error to MARPOR’s original ‘rile’ 
2. re-created rile change based on this new ‘rile’ 
3. estimated the model with the recreated dependent variable and stored the results 
4. repeated steps 1-3 100 times 
5. calculated summary statistics describing the estimates obtained in the 100 models. 
Table A4. Party position change measured as rile change  
 
Dependent variable: rile change 
 
Replication of All motiva-
tions model with rile 
change as dependent varia-
ble 
Simulation of All motivations model (100 iterations with added 
random error to rile change) 
 
Mean coefficients and standard 
errors 
Standard deviation of coeffi-
cients and standard errors 
Opposition -1.390 -1.780 .761 
 
(1.260) (1.434) (.031) 
Office aspiration 1.880 2.269 1.046 
 
(1.750) (1.949) (.051) 
Vote performance -.152 -.168 .101 
 
(.188) (.204) (.005) 
Vote aspiration .065 .018 .026 
 
(.045) (.051) (.002) 
Policy perfor-
mance 
-16.100
***
 -15.964
***
 2.975 
(4.070) (4.742) (.101) 
Policy aspiration -26.900
***
 -30.293
***
 3.807 
 
(6.540) (7.494) (.225) 
ENPseats .195 .087 .181 
 
(.348) (.398) (.013) 
Time between 
elections 
.0001 .001 .001 
(.001) (.001) (.00001) 
Opposition*Office 
aspiration 
-2.670 -1.845 1.201 
(2.120) (2.382) (.053) 
Vote perfor-
mance*Vote aspi-
ration 
-.001 .0001 .004 
(.007) (.007) (.0002) 
Intercept 35.700
***
 41.17
***
 3.622 
 
(6.350) (7.291) (.210) 
σ-Intercept 4.28   
Observations 1,451 
Log Likelihood -5,716 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 11,460 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 11,534 
Note: 
*
p<0.1; 
**
p<0.05; 
***
p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses; adjusted for AR(1) correlated residuals (φ=.242). 
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In Table A4 we see that the replication of the main model of my analysis with rile change 
as the dependent variable yields largely insignificant results. Only the policy-related coefficients 
are statistically significant (p<.01). Having more influence on public policy than a party could 
expect based on its policy-aspirations, reduces party position change on the left-right dimension, 
just as high policy-aspiration levels do. Clearly, high policy aspirations do not lead to positional 
adjustments on the chore ideological dimension of many party systems, as was expected in hy-
pothesis 5b. There is, however, a potential issue of endogeneity in this model, as a party’s ‘rile’ 
position is used to calculate both the dependent and the policy-related independent variables. 
Therefore, basing conclusions about hypothesis 5b on this model seems inappropriate. Further-
more, the simulation taking into account the uncertainty surrounding the ‘rile’-measure that is 
displayed on the right side of Table A4 illustrates that the estimates of a model with rile change 
as its dependent variable need to be treated with caution. As can be expected (cf. Benoit et al. 
2009, 505-07) for models with error-inflicted dependent variables, the simulation shows that 
especially the standard errors of coefficients are estimated as more efficient (i.e. smaller) than 
they most likely are. Similarly, the simulation draws attention to the dangers of relying on point 
estimates of coefficients. While the coefficients estimated in the simulation do not differ mean-
ingfully from those based on a model that does not take into account the uncertainty of measures 
(i.e. they are largely within the 95%-confidence interval of the original coefficient), their size 
and especially conclusions and predictions based on them might be at odds with reality. To illus-
trate this, Figure A6 displays the coefficient of the variable policy aspiration as estimated in the 
first model of Table A4 (blue solid line) along with the values and confidence intervals obtained 
in the error simulation model. We see that the coefficient of the uncorrected model is lower than 
Policy, Office, and Votes – How Party Goals Relate to Party Platform Change 
 
51 
 
the mean and median estimates of the error simulation models, and that potentially its real value 
is as much as ten points more negative.  
          
As a response to these limitations I created the dummy variable significant rile change 
that indicates whether the change reported by rile change is significant at the 5 percent level (see 
above). As this is a dichotomous dependent variable I estimated random intercept logit models, 
with counters and cubic splines to account for the temporal dependence that is present in the data 
(cf. Beck et al. 1998).
10
 The models in Table A5 show that most of the findings related to the 
relationships between party goals, performance, aspirations, and position change do not extend to 
the left-right axis. At the same time, most effects estimated in these models go in the substantial-
ly same direction as those reported in the main analysis. Focusing on the results of the “all moti-
vations” model, it seems that the only effects that extend to positional adjustments on the left-
right dimension are those of the vote aspirations and the policy performance of a party and the 
time between two elections. As reported in the main part of the analysis, a good policy perfor-
mance reduces the likelihood of platform change, while the time between two elections increases 
                                                          
10
 The number of cubic splines was chosen based on a comparison of the model fit of differently specified models. 
The AIC of models with just one cubic spline were generally the lowest, and therefore one cubic spline was in in-
cluded in each model. 
Figure A6.  
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the odds for a party to change. Similarly, parties with higher vote aspirations and a neutral per-
formance seem to be more engaged with positional adjustments on the left-right dimension 
(again, see Somer-Topcu 2009 for similar results).  
Table A5. Party position change measured as significant rile change 
 
Dependent variable: significant rile change 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Opposition -.113 -.167 
   
-.133 
 
(.115) (.182) 
   
(.199) 
Office aspiration 
 
.146 
   
-.299 
  
(.236) 
   
(.254) 
Vote performance 
  
-.028
**
 .009 
 
.003 
   
(.013) (.029) 
 
(.029) 
Vote aspiration 
   
.022
***
 
 
.024
***
 
    
(.005) 
 
(.006) 
Policy performance 
    
-1.970
***
 -2.030
***
 
     
(.594) (.644) 
Policy aspiration 
    
1.090 .148 
     
(.837) (.921) 
Time between elections .0003 .0003 .0003
*
 .0003
*
 .0003
*
 .0003
**
 
 
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) 
ENPseats -.005 -.011 -.003 .056 -.002 .067 
 
(.044) (.044) (.044) (.046) (.044) (.048) 
Counter -.108
***
 -.111
***
 -.108
***
 -.100
***
 -.118
***
 -.105
***
 
 
(.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) 
Cubic spline .960
***
 .971
***
 .927
***
 1.010
***
 .868
***
 .957
***
 
 
(.258) (.257) (.259) (.261) (.259) (.267) 
Opposition*Office aspiration 
 
.296 
   
.078 
  
(.316) 
   
(.325) 
Vote performance*Vote aspiration 
   
-.001 
 
-.001 
    
(.001) 
 
(.001) 
Intercept -.881
***
 -.901
***
 -.977
***
 -1.710
***
 -1.880
**
 -1.710
*
 
 
(.327) (.341) (.314) (.361) (.792) (.905) 
σ-Intercept .457 .426 .474 .46 .437 .45 
Observations 1,643 1,643 1,643 1,643 1,643 1,643 
Log Likelihood -1,071 -1,069 -1,069 -1,058 -1,065 -1,052 
AIC 2,156 2,156 2,153 2,133 2,147 2,132 
BIC 2,194 2,204 2,190 2,182 2,190 2,208 
Note: Random Intercept Logit Regression explaining significant change on the left-right dimension. Coefficients are logit.  
*
p<0.1; 
**
p<0.05; 
***
p<0.01 
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Importantly, parties do not adjust their positions on this dimension if they have high pro-
spects of shaping public policy in the future. The effect of policy aspirations on position change 
is positive but clearly insignificant. Especially this finding supports my argument that policy-
oriented parties with good prospects of shaping public policy in the future adjust their programs 
at the margins, but avoid leaving their ideological chore. Similar patterns can be reported with 
regard to the effects of a party’s office- and vote performance. As can be seen in figures A7 and 
A8, the effects of these variables are in the expected direction, but they never/barely reach statis-
tical significance. Apparently, the mechanisms connecting party goals with platform change do 
not lead parties to change their ideological profile significantly. This pattern is clearly in line 
with the theoretical expectation and empirical observation that parties are constrained by their 
ideological frame and avoid changing their programmatic positions dramatically (see e.g. Budge 
1994; Harmel/Janda 1994).      
 
 
 
 
Figure A7. Marginal effect based on all motivations model 
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